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Now that the dust has settled from the UN climate change 
conference in Copenhagen last December and countries have 
chosen whether or not to sign up to the Copenhagen Accord 
that resulted, it’s a good time to step back and take stock. 
Policymakers and the public had high expectations for the 
summit. Since the international community embarked on a 
new round of climate change negotiations in Bali in 2007, 
elections  in  the  United  States,  Australia,  and  Japan  raised 
developed countries’ climate change ambitions. Key emerging 
economies—including China, India, and Brazil—announced 
their  first  ever  nationwide  climate  change  targets.  Leaders 
from developed and developing alike spoke of the importance 
of international cooperation in addressing climate change and 
called for international action in Copenhagen.
Yet while political will to tackle climate change appeared 
to be building, international climate change negotiations were 
failing to deliver. The UN process launched in Bali struggled 
for two years to reach agreement on even the most basic issues 
between the 192 Parties to the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). Despite a shared commitment 
to multilateral cooperation, positions on what form an inter-
national agreement should take and where the responsibility 
for reducing emissions should fall diverged significantly. 
These two trends collided in Copenhagen when minis-
ters and heads of state arrived to find a negotiation process in 
disarray and no consensus text on the table. Eager to achieve 
an outcome that reflected high-level commitment to the issue, 
leaders scrambled to produce an agreement that would both 
begin  addressing  the  climate  change  challenge  and  build 
support  for  international  cooperation  in  the  years  ahead. 
In the early morning hours on Saturday, December 19, the 
Copenhagen Accord was presented to the Conference of the 
Parties (the group of UNFCCC member countries referred 
to as the COP) for consideration. With six countries oppos-
ing, the consensus driven UN process was unable to formally 
adopt the accord. Instead, countries wishing to sign up to the 
accord were given until January 31, 2010, to do so. 
This  policy  brief  assesses  the  two-week  Copenhagen 
conference, evaluates the Copenhagen Accord, and discusses 
key  issues  the  international  community  will  face  moving 
forward. I argue that despite the chaos in Copenhagen, the 
accord is a significant step forward in addressing global climate 
change. And that because of the chaos in Copenhagen, the 
international community has a unique opportunity to go back 
to first principles and craft a more suitable and sustainable 
long-term approach to this challenge. 
The Bali call To acTion
On  December  10,  2007,  the  Nobel  Committee  presented 
the peace prize to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) and Albert Arnold Gore, Jr. “for their efforts 
to build up and disseminate greater knowledge about man-
made climate change.”1 Vice President Gore’s documentary An 
Inconvenient Truth had raised public awareness of the threat 
1. Mjøs, Professor Ole Danbolt. 2007. Presentation speech by chairman of the 
Norwegian Nobel Committee, December 10. Available at www.nobelprize.
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of global climate change and the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment 
Report  had  increased  public  belief  that  human  activity  is 
largely to blame. Five days later in Indonesia, the 192 Parties 
to the UNFCCC agreed to step up international cooperation 
to address the growing climate change challenge. 
The “Bali Action Plan,” which provided a roadmap for 
the negotiations to conclude in Copenhagen, recognized some 
of the shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC 2007). 
While the Kyoto Protocol included legally binding greenhouse 
gas  (GHG)  emission  reductions,  they  applied  only  to  the 
developed countries included in Annex I of the UNFCCC. 
And while these countries accounted for 60 percent of global 
GHG emissions when the UNFCCC was signed in 1992 (50 
percent if emissions from land-use change are included), they 
will account for only 3 percent of the global growth in emis-
sions going forward (figure 1). Even if all Annex I countries 
reduce emissions to zero by the end of the Kyoto Protocol’s 
first commitment period in 2012, global temperatures would 
still rise to 3.3 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels by 
2100, and rise further after that.2 The IPCC has warned that 
increases above 3 degrees will likely result in more frequent 
extreme weather-related events, decreased agricultural produc-
tivity, growing rates of malnutrition and infectious disease, 
increased risk of extinction for 20 to 30 percent of species, and 
sea level rises that threaten low-lying populations world-wide 
(IPCC 2007).
The  Kyoto  Protocol’s  mitigation  shortcomings  are 
compounded by the fact that the largest Annex I emitter, the 
United States, is not a party. Six months before the Kyoto 
summit  in  1997,  the  US  Senate  passed  the  Byrd-Hagel 
resolution in a vote of 95-0, which urged the White House 
not  to  sign  the  protocol  unless  it  mandated  “new  specific 
commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for 
2. All emissions scenarios in this policy brief are modeled using C-ROADS 
v2.09. The business-as-usual (BAU) scenario uses CO2 emission growth rates 
from the International Energy Agency (2009) for 2005 to 2030 and accounts 
for all policy enacted through mid-year 2009. From 2030 to 2100, emission 
growth rates are an average of the 11 models included in Stanford’s Energy 
Modeling Forum 22 (2009). Deforestation rates are assumed to remain con-
stant at 2005 levels and no additional aforestation is assumed to occur. 
Developing Country Parties.”3 While in the end the Clinton 
administration did sign the protocol, it was never submitted 
to the Senate for ratification. When President Bush took office 
in 2001, he formalized US opposition by withdrawing from 
the Kyoto Protocol as a signatory. 
The Bali Action Plan outlined a vision of a more compre-
hensive  and  environmentally  effective  approach:  one  that 
included mitigation commitments or actions from all coun-
tries, both developed and developing. It also called for mean-
ingful financial assistance to help poor countries reduce emis-
sions and adapt to existing and future changes in the earth’s 
climate, something largely absent from the Kyoto Protocol 
and increasingly important in light of recent science. 
Policy MoveMenT and Rising 
exPecTaTions
In  the  two  years  between  Bali  and  Copenhagen,  climate 
change politics and policies changed significantly in developed 
and developing countries alike. In Australia, the Labor Party 
defeated the Liberal Party in 2007 and Kevin Rudd replaced 
John Howard as prime minister the day the Bali conference 
began. Under Rudd’s leadership, Australia ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol and moved forward with domestic climate change 
legislation. This was followed by a change of government in the 
United States and an about-face in US climate change policy. 
The Obama administration sought to put climate change in 
the top rung of both the domestic and foreign policy agen-
das. The White House included $80 billion in clean energy 
investments  in  the  American  Recovery  and  Reinvestment 
Act of 2009, raised fuel economy standards for vehicles and 
worked with the House of Representatives to pass comprehen-
sive clean energy and climate change legislation. The United 
States  reengaged  in  UN  climate  negotiations,  invigorated 
the Major Economies Forum (a grouping of the 17 largest 
economies started under the Bush administration as the Major 
Economies  Meeting),  and  elevated  climate  change  in  key 
bilateral relationships. And then in August 2009, the Demo-
cratic Party of Japan won control of the Diet, ending over 
50 years of almost continuous rule by the Liberal Democratic 
Party. Shortly after taking office, Prime Minister Hatoyama 
announced far more aggressive Japanese emission reduction 
targets than his predecessor had put forward.
Thanks to these changes, and continued European lead-
3. Byrd-Hagel Resolution (S. Res. 98), United States Senate, July 1997.
. White House Office of the Press Secretary. 2009. President to Attend 
Copenhagen Climate Talks. (November 25). Washington. Available at www.
whitehouse.gov.
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ership  on  climate  change,  there  were  significant  emission 
reduction targets from developed countries on the table when 
the Copenhagen conference began (table 1). The European 
Union pledged to reduce emissions 20 percent below 1990 
levels by 2020 regardless of the outcome in Copenhagen and 
30 percent if the conference produced a strong international 
agreement. Australia and Japan pledged to reduce emissions 25 
percent under the same terms (from a 1990 base for Japan and 
a 2000 base for Australia). And two weeks before the start of 
the conference, President Obama pledged to reduce US emis-
sions 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020 and 83 percent by 
2050, consistent with the climate and clean energy legislation 
that passed the House of Representatives that June. 
And developed countries were not alone in ratcheting up 
their climate change ambitions. In his speech to the United 
Nations General Assembly in September, Chinese President 
Hu Jintao announced nationwide targets for forestry and clean 
energy. And in November, China announced a goal of reduc-
ing the amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) emitted for each unit 
of economic output by 0 to 5 percent between 2005 and 
2020. Two weeks later India followed suit with a carbon inten-
sity target of 20 to 25 percent. By the time delegates arrived in 
Copenhagen, all large emerging economies had joined devel-
oped countries in announcing mitigation targets. 
On top of this movement in domestic action, there were 
positive signs of international cooperation between the larg-
est GHG emitters. At the Major Economies Forum (MEF) 
in L’Aquila Italy in July 2009, leaders representing 75 percent 
of global emissions pledged to “respond vigorously” to the 
challenge of climate change.5 The 11 developed country lead-
ers  agreed  to  “promptly  undertaking  robust  aggregate  and 
individual reductions” and the six developing country leaders 
agreed to “promptly undertake actions whose projected effects 
on emissions represent a meaningful deviation from business 
as usual.” The declaration called for global emissions to peak 
as soon as possible and recognized the scientific view that the 
increase in global temperatures ought not to exceed 2 degrees 
Celsius. While the declaration did not specify individual emis-
sion reduction targets or a specific global emission reduction 
goal, the leaders pledged to work together to define both by 
Copenhagen. The declaration also called for an urgent and 
significant scaling up of financial support for both mitigation 
and  adaptation  and  closer  cooperation  on  low-carbon  and 
adaptation technology. 
Cooperation on climate change played a prominent role 
5. Major Economies Forum. 2009. Declaration of the Leaders of the Major 
Economies Forum on Energy and Climate. (9 July). Available at www.ma-
joreconomiesforum.org. Global emissions estimates are from WRI (2009) and 
include land-use change.
Figure 1 GHG emissions growth
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in bilateral meetings between key countries as well. Following 
the Major Economies Forum in L’Aquila, the United States 
and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
to  enhance  cooperation  on  climate  change,  energy,  and  the 
environment  during  the  US-China  Strategic  and  Economic 
Dialogue in Washington, DC.6 The world’s two largest emitters 
built on this MOU during President Obama’s visit to Beijing 
in  November  by  announcing  a  suite  of  clean  energy  initia-
tives. And with the Copenhagen conference three weeks away, 
President Obama and President Hu resolved to “take signifi-
cant mitigation actions” recognizing the “important role that 
their countries play in promoting a sustainable outcome to the 
conference.”7 
6. US Department of State. 2009. U.S.-China Memorandum of Understanding 
to Enhance Cooperation on Climate Change, Energy and the Environment. (July 
28). Available at www.state.gov.
7. White House Office of the Press Secretary. 2009. U.S.-China Clean Energy 
Announcements. (November 17). Available online at www.whitehouse.gov and 
White House Office of the Press Secretary. 2009. U.S.-China Joint Statement. 
One  week  later,  both  the  United  States  and  China 
announced  their  emission  reduction  offers,8  and  India 
announced a carbon-intensity target on the heels of a US-India 
Summit  in  Washington,  DC,  where  President  Obama  and 
Prime Minister Singh had called for a comprehensive Copenha-
gen outcome that included mitigation offers from both devel-
oped and developing countries.9 The EU-India and EU-China 
Summits, also held in November, produced similar declarations 
of the importance of the climate change challenge and promises 
to tackle it together.10
(November 17). Available at www.whitehouse.gov.
8. Xinhua News. 2009. China announces targets on carbon emissions cuts. (No-
vember 26). Available online at www.news.xinhuanet.com and White House 
Office of the Press Secretary. 2009. President to Attend Copenhagen Climate 
Talks. (November 25). Washington. Available at www.whitehouse.gov.
9. White House Office of the Press Secretary. 2009. Fact Sheet: U.S.-India 
Green Partnership to Address Energy Security, Climate Change, and Food Security. 
(November 2). Available online at www.whitehouse.gov.
10. For information on the EU-China and EU-India summits, see http://
Table 1    The impact of Copenhagen Accord pledges
Billion tons CO2e, 
including land- 
use change 2005
Emissions Reduction from BAU
2020 Billion tons Percent
BAU Low High Low High Low High
Annex I 0.06 19.9 17.9 17.1 1.98 .6 10 1
United States 7.5 7.9 6. 6. 0.89 0.89 1 1
European Union 5.1 .79 .9 .8 0.1 0.95 9 0
Russia* .9 . . .07 0 0.17 0 5
Canada 0.81 0.9 0.7 0.7 0. 0.  
Japan 1. 1. 1 1 0.1 0.1  
Australia 0.65 0.71 0.57 0.7 0.1 0. 0 
Other 1.67 1.66 1.6 1.6 0.0 0.0  
Non-Annex I .71 5.7 .55 .61 .19 .1 6 9
China 6.7 1.6 1.1 11.59 0.1 1.0  8
India* .11 .7 .7 .7 0 0 0 0
Brazil . .9 1.6 1.56 0.8 0.8  5
South Africa 0.51 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.18 0.18  
Mexico 0.75 0.85 0.8 0.6 0.05 0. 6 7
South Korea 0.59 0.7 0.51 0.51 0.1 0.1 9 9
Indonesia 1.95 . 1.75 1.75 0.59 0.59 5 5
Other 9.8 1.5 1.9 1.9 0.0 0.0 0 0
Subtotal .78 55.6 51.7 9.71 .17 5.76 7 11
Potential mitigation from  
   international finance
0 –1.5 0 1.5
Toltal .78 55.6 51.7 8.18 .17 7.9 7 1
* For Russia (high-end) and India, the pledges listed in the accord do not result in a reduction below the business-as-usual pathway used for this analysis.
Source: Author’s estimate of impact of Copenhagen Accord commitments as of March , 010, based on forecasts from IEA (009) and assuming constant deforestation rates 
under business as usual. N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 5   m a r c h   2 0 1 0
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This  flurry  of  high-level  diplomacy  and  movement  in 
domestic policy in the run-up to Copenhagen raised public 
expectations about the conference’s outcome. Unfortunately the 
official UN negotiating process launched in Bali was moving in 
the opposite direction as delegates tussled over how to translate 
growing political will into a tangible agreement. 
PRoBleMs of legal foRM and 
negoTiaTing foRuM
Two  factors,  more  than  any  others,  hampered  the  climate 
change negotiations launched in Bali: disagreement over the 
legal form of a Copenhagen outcome and the limitations of 
the UN as forum for negotiations.
Legal Form
While the Bali Action Plan recognized the need for the inter-
national  community  to  do  more  to  address  global  climate 
change in light of IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, it did 
not specify exactly how that should occur. While most press 
accounts described the Bali Action Plan as a roadmap for a new 
legally binding international agreement to replace the Kyoto 
Protocol,11 the Kyoto Protocol does not actually expire. While 
emission reductions are only specified for 2008–12 (known 
as the first commitment period), the Kyoto Protocol calls for 
Annex I countries to agree to further emission reductions from 
2013,  and  for  negotiations  over  this  “second  commitment 
period” to begin in 2005.12 
And in part because there is no agreed end date for the 
Kyoto Protocol, the Bali Action Plan did not in fact call for 
a new international agreement in Copenhagen, but rather an 
“agreed outcome.”13 Reconciling the existing Kyoto Protocol 
with the Bali mandate for a more comprehensive and environ-
mentally effective approach made finding an “agreed outcome” 
ec.europa.eu/external_relations/china/summits_en.htm and http://ec.europa.
eu/external_relations/india/summit_en.htm, respectively.
11. See New York Times. 2007. Climate Plan Looks Beyond Bush’s Tenure. 
(December 16), which describes the Bali Action Plan as calling for a pact that 
“would take effect in 2012 when the Kyoto Protocol expires.” See also Times 
of London. 2009. Bully for Bali. (December 16), which describes the Bali 
Action Plan as “a clear agenda for two years of talks aimed at negotiating a 
successor to the Kyoto framework.”
12. UNFCCC (1998), Article 3 paragraph 9.
13. This is very different than the “Berlin Mandate” that launched the negotia-
tions that produced the Kyoto Protocol. This 1995 decision by the Parties to 
the UNFCCC called for developed countries to agree to “quantified limitation 
and reduction objectives within specified time-frames, such as 2005, 2010 and 
2020” in a “protocol or another legal instrument” (UNFCCC 1995).
far more challenging than the expressions of high-level politi-
cal support would suggest. Early in 2008, the United Nations 
asked  for  recommendations  on  how  to  achieve  the  goals 
outlined in the Bali Action Plan. The range of responses they 
received, as well as subsequent national submissions to the 
UNFCCC Secretariat, demonstrates just how much disagree-
ment there was between key players on what form a Copenha-
gen outcome should take. 
The European Union
The European Union has long held a leadership position on 
climate  change  and  enjoys  some  of  the  strongest  domestic 
support for addressing the issue. Yet the fact that the Euro-
pean Union is subject to legally binding emission reductions 
under the Kyoto Protocol and the United States isn’t is the 
source of continual angst for EU officials and considerable 
heartburn for European industries that compete internation-
ally. Understanding the United States was unlikely to join the 
Kyoto Protocol, the European Union sought a single post-
2012 agreement that merged the architecture of the Kyoto 
Protocol with the goals of the Bali Action Plan.1 Yet while the 
European Union placed considerable emphasis on the need 
for legally binding targets from the United States,15 they were 
open to continuing the legal asymmetry of the Kyoto Protocol 
in a new agreement. The European Union’s June 2009 submis-
sion to the UNFCCC calls on developing countries to submit 
nonbinding low-carbon development strategies that outline 
where financial support to reduce emissions is needed.16
1. In its first submission to the UNFCCC following Bali, the European 
Union stressed that the conference “emphasised the need for a comprehensive 
post-2012 agreement to be reached by 2009.” (FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/
MISC.1). In Council of the European Union. 2009. Presidency Conclusions. 
Brussels. (October 29). Available at www.consilium.europa.eu the European 
Council “emphasises the need for a legally binding agreement for the period 
starting 1 January 2013 that builds on the Kyoto Protocol and incorporates all 
its essentials.” 
15. In submissions to the UNFCCC, they stated that a Copenhagen Accord 
“should set binding quantified emission limitation or reduction commitments 
for developed countries comprising at least all Parties listed in Annex I to 
the UNFCCC and all current EU Member States, EU candidate countries 
and potential candidate countries that are not included in Annex I to the 
UNFCCC” (UNFCCC 2009g). 
16. “The EU proposes to include in the negotiation text the concept of 
low-carbon development strategies (LCDS), as the structure for developing 
countries to indicate their contribution to the global mitigation effort and to 
describe the nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) they intend 
to undertake in order to realise this contribution, as well as to indicate what 
support would be necessary to enable these NAMAs” (UNFCCC 2009c).N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 5   m a r c h   2 0 1 0
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The United States
While  unwilling  to  join  the  Kyoto  Protocol,  the  Obama 
administration made it clear that the United States was inter-
ested in a legally binding agreement provided that it was legally 
binding for developed and major developing countries alike.17 
Countries could take different types of actions to reduce emis-
sions based on their level of development (e.g., absolute emis-
sion reduction targets for rich countries versus policies and 
measures that slow the rate of emissions growth in emerging 
economies).18 But all countries with significant GHG emis-
sions should list their actions in a Copenhagen agreement and 
be held accountable for meeting them in the same way. 
What was not acceptable to the US was a new treaty that 
perpetuated the binary distinction between developed coun-
tries and developing countries embodied in the UNFCCC and 
the Kyoto Protocol (figure 2). Since the UNFCCC was signed 
in 1992, developing countries as a group have narrowed the 
income gap with developed countries, and the most affluent 
among them are now considerably richer than many coun-
tries listed as developed in its Annex I. In 1992, 20 percent 
of countries deemed “developed” and included in Annex I of 
17. See Stern, Todd. 2009. Speech to the Center for American Progress, June 
. Available at www.americanprogress.org. See also Obama, Barack. 2009. 
Remarks at United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon’s Climate Change 
Summit, New York, September 22. Available at www.whitehouse.gov.
18. See the US May 2009 submission to the UNFCCC (2009c).
the convention, had per capita incomes between $6,000 and 
$8,000 (in real 2005 dollars, adjusted for purchasing power 
parity). By 2008, more than 0 percent of countries deemed 
“developing” under the UNFCCC had incomes at or above 
this level (figure 2), including South Africa at $9,300 and 
Brazil at $9,500. In 2010 China’s per capita income will pass 
the $6,000 mark as well. 
The fact that neither the UNFCCC nor the Kyoto Protocol 
includes a mechanism to adjust countries’ levels of obligation 
over time means the Ukraine (per capita income of $6,700 in 
2008) is expected to take on legally binding emission reduc-
tions while Singapore (per capita income of $5,000, the third 
highest in the world) is not. The US position from the start of 
the negotiations was that an equitable, politically acceptable, 
and environmentally effective treaty would need to allow for 
“graduation” as countries get richer and have greater capability 
to reduce emissions. 
This view was strongly supported by the US Congress. 
The American Clean Energy and Security Act, passed by the 
US House of Representatives in June 2009, states “it is the 
policy  of  the  United  States  to  work  proactively  under  the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
and  in  other  appropriate  fora,  to  establish  binding  agree-
ments, including sectoral agreements, committing all major 
greenhouse gas-emitting nations to contribute equitably to the 
reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions.”19
19. US House of Representatives. 2009. American Clean Energy and Security 
Figure 2 Per capita Income of UNFCCC parties
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Australia, Canada, Japan, and Russia
Australia, Canada, Japan, and Russia had a combination of 
European and American concerns regarding the legal form 
of a Copenhagen outcome. As Annex I parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol, they, like the European Union, sought a single agree-
ment with US participation that would encompass both the 
mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol and the mandate of the 
Bali Action Plan.20 But like the United States, these countries 
wanted legal symmetry in that new agreement between devel-
oped and developing countries and a way to expect more from 
developing countries over time.21 Australia proposed that a 
new treaty include “national schedules” where countries list 
their domestic mitigation actions and update them as their 
national circumstances change and abilities to reduce emis-
sions increase.22 While the content of each country’s national 
schedule would differ based on level of development, the legal 
form would be the same: everyone would commit to carry out 
the actions they chose to list.
Emerging Economies
While  large  developing  countries  like  Brazil,  South  Africa, 
India,  and  China  (a  grouping  known  as  BASIC)  had  all 
announced more ambitious domestic climate policy in the 
run-up to Copenhagen, they were extremely reluctant to be 
internationally bound to their mitigation actions. The exist-
ing legal structure of the Kyoto Protocol, which all developed 
countries had agreed to (though the United States later pulled 
out), contains no obligations for developing countries. While 
BASIC countries were willing to do more than ever before 
to reduce emissions, they stood to gain little by volunteering 
those goals as new legal obligations.
Act of 2009. H.R. 25, 111th Congress.
20. See, for example, the following passage from Australia’s March 2009 
submission to the UNFCCC: “From the perspective of legal certainty, 
operational efficiency and simplicity, the most effective legal structure for a 
post-2012 outcome would be a single new protocol that unifies action under 
the Convention and builds on the relevant provisions of the Kyoto Protocol” 
(UNFCCC 2009h).
21. See from Australia’s March 2008 submission “There is considerable varia-
tion in the circumstances of the 191 countries in the UNFCCC. Accordingly 
there can be many different approaches to differentiating and grouping 
countries according to such circumstances” (UNFCCC 2008b). See also 
from Japan’s August 2008 submission “An idea to respond to this situation 
is to categorize non-Annex I Parties into groups based on stages of economic 
development etc. and to encourage each Party to take suitable actions matched 
to its own group, in accordance with the principle of equity and the principle 
of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’” 
(UNFCCC 2008a). 
22. UNFCCC (2009f).
In addition, energy and climate policy is different than 
other areas where developing countries have taken on interna-
tional commitments in the past. In trade, for example, poli-
cymakers have a high degree of certainty that once policy is 
enacted to reduce tariffs as part of an international agreement, 
the tariffs will actually be reduced—all it takes is a phone call 
to the customs bureau. The outcome of energy and climate 
policy  is  less  clear  as  the  effectiveness  of  mechanisms  like 
feed-in tariffs to spur renewable energy, standards to improve 
building efficiency, and carbon pricing to reduce emission all 
depend on a host of factors outside the policy domain. Even in 
the United States, where the Congress is considering cap-and-
trade legislation, the fact that the cap only covers 85 percent 
of the economy creates uncertainty about the ability to meet 
defined targets. And in rapidly growing developing countries 
where meaningful energy policy is just being tested and energy 
demand is highly volatile, the uncertainty is even greater. 
Finally, even if BASIC countries were confident about 
their  current  targets,  they  were  leery  of  what  might  be 
expected of them down the line. Any Copenhagen agreement 
would likely include a review of adequacy—an assessment of 
whether collective emission reductions are enough to achieve 
defined environmental goals, such as limiting global tempera-
ture increases to 2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels. 
Assuming developed countries make good on their offers and 
start moving toward emission reductions of 80 to 90 percent 
in 2050, by 2020 it will fall to BASIC countries and other 
emerging economies to ratchet up their level of ambition if the 
world is coming up short. Agreeing to legally binding, though 
moderately ambitious, commitments now could put them in a 
position in the coming years where they are compelled to take 
more aggressive and less politically palatable steps. 
Because of the highly preferential legal structure of the 
Kyoto Protocol, reluctance to be bound to emission reduction 
results during a period of policy formation and experimenta-
tion, and concern about opening the door to further obliga-
tions, BASIC countries sought two Copenhagen agreements: 
a  second  commitment  period  under  the  Kyoto  Protocol 
with legally binding commitments for developed countries, 
and a new agreement with economywide emission reduction 
commitments from the United States and nonbinding mitiga-
tion actions from developing countries.23 
23. From China’s February 2008 submission to the UNFCCC: “The 
two-track approach negotiation processes under the Convention and the 
Kyoto Protocol show that the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol are the 
foundation of addressing climate change by the international community 
in the future” (UNFCCC 2008c). From India’s February 2008 submission: 
“The most important aspects of mitigation are binding GHG reduction com-
mitments post 2012 by Annex I Parties. These are being discussed separately N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 5   m a r c h   2 0 1 0
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Vulnerable Countries
While  133  of  the  151  developing  country  parties  to  the 
UNFCCC often negotiate collectively as the G-77, their inter-
ests differ greatly. The Kyoto Protocol works well for BASIC 
countries because it limits obligations to Annex I countries 
but doesn’t meet the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable 
developing countries. First, the Kyoto Protocol provides only 
limited resources to help developing countries reduce emis-
sions, and provides almost nothing to help vulnerable coun-
tries adapt to climate change. Second, with only developed 
countries required to reduce emissions, the Kyoto Protocol 
falls  far  short  of  the  global  emission  reductions  needed  to 
protect vulnerable countries from the consequences of a world 
that is greater than 2 degrees Celsius warmer than preindus-
trial levels.
As  a  result,  the  poorest  and  most  vulnerable  develop-
ing  countries—e.g.,  the  African  Group,  Least  Developed 
Countries (LDCs), and the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS)—were more enthusiastic about the prospect of a new 
agreement following the 2007 Bali conference. In submissions 
to the UNFCCC in February 2008, LDCs called for agree-
ment on a “global mean temperature increase and peaking year 
for CO2” and to “determine global mitigation targets for post-
Kyoto climate regime.”2 Out of G-77 solidarity, vulnerable 
countries never called explicitly for legally binding commit-
ments from large emerging economies, but called for binding 
global emission reduction targets that translate into de facto 
commitments for the biggest developing countries.
Negotiating Forum
Reconciling differences between these groups proved impos-
sible at the working level in a UN negotiating process where 
consensus between all 192 parties to the UNFCCC is required 
to move forward. Despite eight formal negotiating sessions 
in the Adhoc Working Group (AWG) under Kyoto Protocol, which also 
has a December 2009 deadline. These should be pursued vigorously and be 
independently adopted at CoP-15/MoP-5” (UNFCCC 2008c). From China’s 
March 2009 submission: “According to Paragraph 1 (b) (i) of the BAP, all 
Annex I Parties, whether they are Parties to the Kyoto Protocol or not, shall 
commit to legally-binding quantified emission reduction targets. Emission 
reduction targets committed by developed country Parties to the Convention 
shall be comparable to targets committed by developed country Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol…. Nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing 
countries shall be country-driven, in conformity with the legitimate and prior 
needs of developing countries for sustained economic growth and eradication 
of poverty. The form of specific actions shall be subject to the determination 
of each developing country, taking into account its respective capacities and 
specific national circumstances” (UNFCCC 2009i).
2. UNFCCC (2008c).
between  Bali  and  Copenhagen,  accounting  for  73  days  in 
total, very little progress was made. During the first half 2009, 
the UNFCCC secretariat invited countries to propose text 
for an outcome of the Long-term Cooperative Action (LCA) 
negotiating track, the process charged with implementing the 
Bali Action Plan. In advance of the June UNFCCC meeting in 
Bonn, the chair of the LCA attempted to distill these submis-
sions into a consensus text. It ran 53 pages with multiple 
options listed for key issues and significant portions bracketed 
(reflecting a lack of agreement).25 
Two months later, rather than narrowing these differences, 
negotiations had lengthened the text to 199 pages with even 
less consensus.26 There was considerable disagreement on all 
five core elements of the Bali Action Plan: (1) a shared vision 
for long-term global emission reductions; (2) specific mitiga-
tion commitments and actions by developed and developing 
countries; (3) helping vulnerable countries adapt to climate 
change; () cooperation on low-carbon and adaptation tech-
nology; and (5) financial support for mitigation, adaptation, 
and  technology  cooperation.  And  while  much  of  this  was 
substantive, finding common ground was hampered by uncer-
tainty over the fate of the Kyoto Protocol and disagreement on 
the legal form of a new Copenhagen agreement. 
By the fall of 2009, it became clear the UN process would 
not be able to deliver a new treaty in December, due in large 
part to different views on which countries should be legally 
bound. Hoping to prevent disagreement over legal form from 
derailing  the  high-level  political  support  that  was  building 
in advance of Copenhagen, the Danish chair sought to reset 
expectations for the conference’s outcome. Addressing a group 
of legislators from around the world in late October and citing 
the fact that “virtually all countries with major emissions have 
adopted  ambitious  climate  legislation”  or  are  “mounting 
new plans and political momentum to get them approved,” 
Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen called for the international 
25. UNFCCC (2009d).
26. UNFCCC (2009e).
Two factors, more than any others, 
hampered the climate change negotiations 
launched in Bali: disagreement over 
the legal form of a Copenhagen 
outcome and the limitations of the 
UN as forum for negotiations.N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 5   m a r c h   2 0 1 0
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community to capture this “wave of change” with a politi-
cal accord that contained all the elements of a final deal. The 
accord would be immediately operational while work contin-
ued  toward  a  legally  binding  agreement.27  He  pledged  to 
engage a “growing number of leaders” as part of “Copenhagen 
Commitment Circle” that could begin to build momentum 
toward this kind of outcome. 
Three  weeks  later,  Prime  Minister  Rasmussen  flew  to 
Singapore to meet with the 20 heads of state gathered for the 
annual  meeting  of  the  Asia-Pacific  Economic  Cooperation 
(APEC) summit to discuss how to achieve such an accord.28 
In Beijing following the APEC summit, US President Obama 
and Chinese President Hu agreed in a joint statement that:
“…while striving for final legal agreement, an agreed 
outcome at Copenhagen should, based on the principle 
of common but differentiated responsibilities and respec-
tive capabilities, include emission reduction targets of 
developed  countries  and  nationally  appropriate  miti-
gation actions of developing countries. The outcome 
should  also  substantially  scale  up  financial  assistance 
to developing countries, promote technology develop-
ment, dissemination and transfer, pay particular atten-
tion to the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable to 
adapt to climate change, promote steps to preserve and 
enhance forests, and provide for full transparency with 
respect to the implementation of mitigation measures 
and  provision  of  financial,  technology  and  capacity 
building support.”29
The joint statement from the US-India summit in Wash-
ington on November 2 set a similar goal for a Copenhagen 
outcome.30  And  European  leaders  were  also  beginning  to 
recalibrate their expectations. Following a meeting with Prime 
Minister Rasmussen on November 19, German Chancellor 
Merkel and French President Sarkozy acknowledged that a new 
treaty would not be possible during the December conference 
but that a politically binding accord could still contain all the 
substance of a full legal agreement to be completed in 2010.31
27. Available online at http://copenhagen.globeinternational.org/includes/doc-
uments/cm_docs/2009/p/prime_minister_lars_lkke_rasmussen_mp_speech.
pdf.
28. Weisman, Jonathan. 2009. APEC Leaders Move to Rescue Copenhagen 
Deal. Wall Street Journal. (November1).
29. White House Office of the Press Secretary. 2009. U.S.-China Joint State-
ment. (November 17). Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov.
30. White House Office of the Press Secretary. 2009. Joint Statement between 
Prime Minister Dr. Singh and President Obama. (November 2). Available at 
www.whitehouse.gov.
31. O’Donnell, John. 2009. Germany’s Merkel repeats call for climate cut 
rules. Reuters. (November19).
collision in coPenhagen
The Copenhagen conference ran for two weeks, with working-
level negotiations during the first week, followed by ministe-
rial negotiations, ending with the arrival of 110 heads of state. 
Two rounds of UN negotiations during the fall (Bangkok in 
October and Barcelona in November) had made little prog-
ress. The 199-page negotiating text had been reduced to 163 
pages, but there was still no consensus on key issues.32 This 
is what the delegates had to work with when they arrived on 
December 7. 
The  fundamental  disagreements  over  the  nature  of  a 
Copenhagen  outcome  that  had  hampered  the  negotiations 
since Bali were immediately on display day one of the Copen-
hagen conference. Then on December 8 one of the various 
draft texts prepared by the Danish government in the run-
up to the conference in an attempt identify areas of politi-
cal consensus was leaked.33 While the Danes had engaged a 
number of developed and developing countries in this process, 
not all 192 countries had a seat at the table and the conference 
host was criticized for running an exclusive and nontranspar-
ent process. 
Reaching agreement in UN climate negotiations requires 
a strong and credible chair that can elevate the dialogue to a 
ministerial level, convene a representative small-group process 
to broker a deal, and introduce a consensus text that’s seen as 
equitable to all sides. The leaked text weakened the Danes’ 
ability to play this role. In addition, growing suspicion among 
developing countries that Europe, Canada, Australia, Russia, 
and Japan were trying to “kill” the Kyoto Protocol in favor of 
a new agreement prompted a number of developing countries 
to block progress in the LCA until they saw movement in the 
Kyoto Protocol track.3 As discussed above, large developing 
countries stood to lose from any erosion of the legal asymme-
try of the Kyoto Protocol and the rest of the developing world 
wasn’t yet convinced they had much to gain from a new agree-
ment given how slowly negotiations had proceeded during the 
past two years.
That changed in the last three days of the conference. Shortly 
before Copenhagen began, developed countries had announced 
their intention to provide a combined $10 billion per year by 
2012 to support mitigation and adaptation in developing coun-
tries.35 While developed countries acknowledged that number 
32. UNFCCC (2009b).
33. Vidal, John. 2009. Copenhagen climate summit in disarray after “Danish 
text” leak. (December 8). The Guardian. Available at www.guardian.co.uk.
3. Ward, Andrew. 2009. Deadlock threatens Copenhagen climate deal. The 
Financial Times. (December 1). Available at www.ft.com.
35. White House Office of the Press Secretary. Statement from the Press N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 5   m a r c h   2 0 1 0
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would need to scale up considerably by 2020, no specific figure 
had been offered. Vulnerable countries were reluctant to see the 
G-77 give away its only real negotiating leverage—the 2020 
emission reduction commitments of its larger members—with-
out firm 2020 finance numbers in return. 
On Wednesday, December 16, Ethiopian President Meles 
Zenawi announced that $100 billion per year in 2020 would 
be  a  sufficient  offer  from  developed  countries.36  This  was 
considerably lower than the previous requests from the G-77, 
which ranged between $200 billion and $500 billion. Then on 
Thursday, December 17, Secretary of State Clinton announced 
in Copenhagen that the United States was prepared to “work 
with other countries toward a goal of jointly mobilizing $100 
billion a year by 2020 to address the climate change needs 
of developing countries.”  37 But she made it clear that the 
offer was contingent on the conference producing a “strong 
accord in which all major economies stand behind meaningful 
mitigation actions and provide full transparency as to their 
implementation.”
With  Secretary  Clinton’s  announcement,  a  key  G-77 
demand  had  been  met  and  a  large  number  of  developing 
countries now had something to lose if Copenhagen failed 
to produce an agreement. Yet while the pieces of a politi-
cal deal were starting to come into place, with the Danish 
chair discredited there was still no clear pathway to deliver an 
outcome. So when heads of state arrived late Thursday night 
and early Friday morning, they found the negotiating text no 
further than at the start of the conference. 
With one day left before the close of the conference the 
Danish chair, with the support of a number of leaders, made 
Secretary on the United Nations Climate Change Conference. (December , 
2009). Available at www.whitehouse.gov.
36. Eilperin, Juliet, and David A. Fahrenthold. 2009. At Copenhagen, both 
rich and poor nations offer concessions. Washington Post. (December 17). 
Available at www.washingtonpost.com.
37. Clinton, Hillary. 2009. Remarks at the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change, Copenhagen, December 17. 
one more attempt to convene a representative set of players to 
broker an agreement. Meeting all afternoon Friday and into 
the early morning hours, this group of roughly 30 countries 
drafted the Copenhagen Accord.38 Speaking later in defense of 
the accord, the representative from Grenada identified most 
of the participants, which included both key developed coun-
tries (Japan, Canada, Australia, the United States, Russia, and 
several European states), large developing countries (China, 
India, Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa), and representation 
from vulnerable country groups (Grenada and the Maldives 
on behalf of AOSIS; Lesotho and Bangladesh on behalf of 
LDCs; and Algeria and Ethiopia on behalf of Africa).39 Most 
were represented at the head-of-state level, with the excep-
tion of the BASIC countries. The leaders went paragraph by 
paragraph through the text (an almost unprecedented event 
in multilateral diplomacy) and were able to reach agreement 
on the most fundamental issues in the negotiations. Where 
the BASIC country representatives in the meeting did not 
have sufficient authority, President Obama was able to broker 
agreement through a separate session with Chinese Premier 
Wen, Indian Prime Minister Singh, Brazilian President Lula, 
and South African President Zuma. 
Early  Saturday  morning,  Prime  Minister  Rasmussen 
presented the Copenhagen Accord to the full Conference of 
the Parties (COP) for consideration. While it reflected the 
political will at the highest level of a broad a representative 
group of countries, UN procedures required that it be accepted 
by all 192 Parties to the UNFCCC to have formal standing. 
Six countries spoke out against the accord—Sudan, Venezuela, 
Cuba,  Bolivia,  Nicaragua,  and  Tuvalu—thus  preventing  it 
from being adopted as a COP decision. A statement by Sudan 
equating the accord to the Holocaust prompted developed and 
developing countries alike, including those most vulnerable 
to the impacts of climate change, to rise in its defense. After 
several attempts to have the accord adopted through a COP 
decision with the same six countries opposing, the best the 
body could do was “take note” of the document. The United 
Nations announced that those countries wishing to sign up 
to the accord (or “associate” with the accord as the United 
Nations describes it) could do so by notifying the UNFCCC 
secretariat of their intent by January 31, 2010. 
38. United Nations. 2009. Copenhagen Accord to advance climate change 
action. (December 19). Available at www.un.org.
39. Webcast of event available online at http://www7.cop15.meta-fusion.
com/kongresse/cop15/templ/play.php?id_kongressmain=1&theme=cop15&id
_kongresssession=2761.
The international community does not 
necessarily need to choose between 
a UN process aimed at producing a 
legally binding agreement and a small-
group process seeking to begin work 
now on a politically binding basisN u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 5   m a r c h   2 0 1 0
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assessing The ouTcoMe
The Copenhagen Accord is a three-page political document 
covering all five pieces of the Bali Action Plan and reflecting 
agreement on the three key substantive issues in the negotia-
tions: mitigation, transparency, and finance.0 
Mitigation
On mitigation, the accord calls for “deep cuts in global emis-
sions…so as to hold the increase in global temperatures below 2 
degrees Celsius.” Annex I parties commit to take on quantified 
economywide emissions targets for 2020 to be listed in Appen-
dix I of the accord by January 31, 2010. Non-Annex I parties 
agree to implement domestic mitigation actions to be listed in 
Appendix II of the accord by January 31, 2010. 
Now that the January 31 deadline has passed it’s possible 
to assess how comprehensive and environmentally effective the 
accord has the potential to be. The United Nations has posted a 
list of countries that have signed up to the Copenhagen Accord 
along  with  a  catalogue  of  their  emission  reduction  commit-
ments.1 As of March 2 the list includes 106 countries (0 devel-
oped and 66 developing), accounting for 81 percent of global 
emissions and 76 percent of global population. Of these coun-
tries, 72 have listed specific national emission reduction plans. 
How far Do the Current Pledges Get Us?
To evaluate the environmental impact of the listed national 
actions, I measured them against what is projected to occur 
under business as usual (BAU).2 The BAU trajectory chosen 
for this analysis captures all national policy enacted through 
mid-year 2009 but excludes policy only under consideration. 
It results in growth of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
from 5 billion tons in 2005 to 56 billion tons in 2020 to 113 
billion tons by 2100. By the end of the century atmospheric 
GHG concentrations reach 1,055 parts per million (ppm) and 
global temperatures rise more than  degrees Celsius.3 
0. UNFCCC (2009a).
1. Available online at http://unfccc.int/home/items/5262.php.
2. The BAU scenario used in this analysis takes emission growth rates 
projected by the International Energy Agency’s 2009 World Energy Outlook 
(IEA 2009) from 2005–30. From 2030–2100, emission growth rates are based 
on an average of the 11 models included in the Stanford University Energy 
Modeling Forum exercise (2009). This results in an emissions pathway in the 
middle of the range of projections used by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (http://www.grida.no/publications/other/ipcc_sr/?src=/cli-
mate/ipcc/emission/).
3. Atmospheric concentrations and global temperature changes modeled 
Against this BAU trajectory, the national pledges currently 
listed in the Copenhagen Accord would reduce emissions to 
between 9.7 and 51.5 billion tons in 2020 (table 1, figure 3, 
and figure ). That’s 7 to 11 percent below BAU. The range is 
due to the fact that several countries have provided both “low” 
(less ambitious) and “high” targets either conditional on other 
countries’ actions or due to uncertainty about the impact of 
domestic actions. If the $100 billion in international financial 
assistance  called  for  in  the  Copenhagen  Accord  materializes 
and half is used for emission reductions (the other half helping 
countries adapt to climate change), it could reduce emissions to 
as low as 8 billion tons (or 13 percent below BAU). 
Here some caveats are required. While developed country 
targets are defined as absolute reductions below a base year, 
developing country targets are somewhat more relaxed in that 
they are defined either as a reduction in the amount of CO2 
emitted for each unit of economic growth (China and India) or 
as a reduction below BAU (everyone else). These standards allow 
developing countries more latitude to achieve the economic 
growth they need to lift their populations out of poverty.
The actual impact of a specific carbon-intensity target for 
developing countries, however, depends on how fast their econ-
omies grow—faster-than-expected growth will lead to higher 
emissions. And the impact of a BAU target depends on what the 
country in question thinks will happen in the absence of policy 
action. As no country other than Brazil has specified a BAU 
pathway to date, there is some uncertainty about the emission 
reductions their targets will ultimately deliver. Finally, achieving 
the full 1.53 billion tons of mitigation possible through inter-
national financial assistance would require that none of those 
emission  reductions  get  counted  against  developed  country 
targets (as occurs with international offsets) and none of the 
major  developing  countries  use  international  financial  assis-
tance to meet the targets inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord. 
Neither is likely to be entirely the case.
Are the Copenhagen Commitments Consistent with a  
2-degree World?
The  Copenhagen  Accord  only  contains  emission  reduc-
tion commitments through 2020. Whether we limit global 
using the C-ROADS platform (http://climateinteractive.org/simulations/C-
ROADS).
. Mitigation potential through international financial assistance calculated 
using the international allowance price in 2020 forecast by the Energy Infor-
mation Administration under the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 
2009 (http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/hr25/index.html).N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 5   m a r c h   2 0 1 0
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temperature increases to 2 degrees Celsius also depends on 
what countries do after 2020. Recent analysis has called for 
global emissions to peak by 2020 at between 0 and 8 billion 
tons to have a reasonable chance of meeting a 2-degree long-
term  temperature  goal.5  That’s  based  on  an  assessment  of 
what kind of emission reductions post-2020 will be techni-
cally and politically feasible. Higher emissions in 2020 will 
require steeper and more costly reductions thereafter. 
Accurately assessing mitigation potential and cost post-
2020  requires  comprehensive  analysis  of  economic  growth 
trajectories,  technological  change,  and  natural  resource 
profiles country-by-country. In the coming months, energy 
and climate modelers will be doing just that, and providing us 
with a clearer sense of where the Copenhagen Accord commit-
ments leave the world in 2020. 
For  the  time  being,  I’ve  used  a  back-of-the  envelope 
approach to ballpark whether meeting the 2-degree target is 
possible given the commitments in the Copenhagen Accord by 
imposing the following two constraints on post-2020 action:
1.  Equity:  No  country  should  be  required  to  make  cuts 
that result in lower per-capita emissions than the Euro-
pean Union in 2050 (including emissions from land-use 
5. See for example Bowen and Ranger (2009).
change), assuming the European Union reduces emissions 
80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050.6 
2.  Cost  and  feasibility:  No  country  should  be  required  to 
reduce fossil fuel emissions between 2020 and 2050 at a 
greater annual rate (adjusted for economic growth) than 
the United States under the American Clean Energy and 
Security  act  of  2009  (83  percent  below  2005  levels  by 
2050).7 
I  modeled  these  post-2020  emissions  pathways,  along 
with the 2005–20 actions listed in the Copenhagen Accord, 
using the C-ROADS modeling platform developed by Climate 
Interactive, the Sustainability Institute, and MIT.8 The result 
was a peak in atmospheric GHG concentrations between 87 
6. From 2050–2100 all countries’ per capita emissions converge at 1 ton.
7. For Brazil and Indonesia, a significant reduction in deforestation is 
required to achieve per-capita equity with the European Union in 2050.
8. Information on C-ROADS is available at http://climateinteractive.
org/simulations/C-ROADS. GDP and population growth in my analysis 
differ from the C-ROADS defaults. GDP growth estimates are from the 
International Energy Agencies’ 2009 World Energy Outlook for 2005–20 
(IEA 2009), and from the 11 models included in Stanford’s Energy Modeling 
Forum (2009) for 2020–2100. Population growth estimates are from the UN 
Population Division for 2005–50 (2009) and from EMF-22 for 2050–2100 
(Stanford 2009).
Figure 3 GHG emission reductions from Copenhagen Accord in 2020
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Source: Author's estimate of impact of Copenhagen Accord commitments as of March 2, 2010, based on forecasts from IEA (2009) and
assuming constant deforestation rates under business as usual.
2N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 5   m a r c h   2 0 1 0
1
and 90 ppm (figure 2). Translating that into temperature 
change is challenging because of uncertainty about the behav-
ior of the climate system. The C-ROADS model shows a likely 
temperature increase in the 1.3- to 2.-degrees Celsius range 
with a “best guess” of 1.8 degrees. This is lower than estimates 
from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
whose “best guess” on the impact of a 50- to 500-ppm world 
is between 2.1 and 2. degrees Celsius.9 Either way, if coun-
tries follow through on their pledges and follow on with more 
aggressive  action,  it  looks  like  keeping  global  temperature 
increases  below  2  degrees  Celsius  is  still  within  reach.  Of 
course, the more countries ratchet up mid-term action, the 
better the chances get. 
The accord calls for an assessment by 2015 of the effec-
tiveness of the national actions listed in the appendices. This 
review would include consideration of whether to strengthen 
the  long-term  goal  from  2  degrees  Celsius  to  1.5  degrees 
Celsius. Though implied by the temperature goal, the accord 
does not specify a global emission reduction target, such as a 
50 percent cut by 2050, which developed countries, LDCs, 
AOSIS, and African countries had sought.
9. See IPCC (2007).
Transparency
On transparency, the mitigation actions of both developed and 
developing countries will be subject to international scrutiny. 
Annex I country mitigation actions will be evaluated using 
existing  guidelines.  This  consists  of  annual  expert  reviews 
of  the  greenhouse  gas  emission  inventories  and  reports  on 
national actions submitted to the UNFCCC coupled with an 
in-country expert visit at the invitation of the submitting party. 
Non-Annex I countries agreed to also provide greenhouse gas 
inventories and report on the effectiveness of their actions 
in  reducing  emissions  (every  two  years)  to  the  UNFCCC 
secretariat. These reports will then be subject to international 
consultation and analysis, using guidelines to be determined 
by the Conference of the Parties. Developing country actions 
supported by international finance and technology assistance 
will be subject to more stringent international verification. 
The provision of financial support and progress on technology 
cooperation will also be subject to international scrutiny. 
Transparency was a key issue in the negotiations and a 
significant  sticking  point  in  talks  with  BASIC  countries. 
Subjecting  developing  country  actions  to  international 
consultation and analysis erodes the strict asymmetry between 
Annex I and non-Annex I countries enshrined in the Kyoto 
Protocol and builds confidence that all major economies are 
Figure 4 Carrying the Copenhagen commitments forward
billion tons CO e - potential emission reductions following the pledges in the



















































































































































































Source: Historic emissions from CDIAC (2009). BAU emissions projections based on IEA (2009) and Stanford (2009). Emission
reduction pathways are author's estimates based on Copenhagen Accord commitments as of March 2, 2010, and post-2020
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standing behind their commitments. While in the end the 
BASIC countries acquiesced to the transparency provisions 
sought by the US, the guidelines for international review of 
developing country actions are yet to be determined, ensuring 
this continues to be a contentious issue in the years ahead. 
Finance
On  finance,  the  accord  calls  for  the  establishment  of  a 
“Copenhagen Green Climate Fund” to support mitigation, 
adaptation, and technology cooperation. Developed countries 
pledged a combined $30 billion between 2010 and 2012 and 
$100 billion per year by 2020, and a “significant portion” of 
that funding is to flow through the new fund. The poorest 
and most vulnerable developing countries will have priority in 
receiving financial assistance. The accord also called for a high-
level panel “to study the contribution of the potential sources 
of revenue.”50 On February 12 the United Nations established 
such a panel called the “Advisory Group on Climate Change 
Financing,”  co-chaired  by  British  Prime  Minister  Gordon 
Brown and Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi.51
Other Issues
The  accord  provides  less  detail  on  technology  cooperation 
and deforestation. These were two issues where the working-
level negotiations during the conference had actually made 
meaningful progress. How that work relates to the Copenha-
gen Accord is not defined. And there are a number of places 
were the accord makes reference to the convention or relies 
on decisions by the Conference of the Parties (such as setting 
guidelines for how developing countries report emissions or 
establishing mechanisms like the High Level Panel on finance) 
even though the accord has no formal standing under the 
UNFCCC. Finally, the accord does not specify a pathway or 
timeline for transitioning to a legally binding treaty. These are 
critical questions that countries who sign up to the Copen-
hagen Accord will need to address in the coming months to 
translate this agreement into action.
Moving foRwaRd
Negotiated directly by heads of state, the Copenhagen Accord 
reflects a high level of political will to address the climate 
change  challenge.  By  attracting  a  broad  and  representative 
50. UNFCCC (2009a).
51. Gronewold, Nathanial. 2010. U.N. Gets Rolling on Copenhagen Accord, 
Forms Finance Panel. New York Times. (February 12). Available at www.
nytimes.com.
group of countries, the accord has the potential to significantly 
advance international action. If countries associated with the 
accord carry out the commitments they have inscribed in its 
appendices, the world stands a chance of averting the worst 
consequences of climate change. Transparent reporting on the 
effectiveness of these mitigation actions to the international 
community will increase confidence in the group’s ability to 
meet this common challenge. And if the financing called for 
in the Copenhagen Accord is realized, global emission will 
be reduced further and the most vulnerable countries will be 
better equipped to adapt to the warming already occurring. 
Because the COP did not formally adopt the Copenhagen 
Accord, the pathway forward is unclear. Furthermore, despite 
widespread calls to turn the Copenhagen Accord into a treaty 
at the next Conference of the Parties this December in Cancún, 
Mexico, the underlying issues of legal form and negotiating 
forum that plagued the past two years of climate talks have 
not gone away. The fact that the Copenhagen Accord is politi-
cally binding and that the two formal UNFCCC negotiating 
tracks (the Kyoto Protocol and the LCA) are set to continue 
allowed the parties to reach agreement on substance with-
out compromising their position on these institutional and 
process questions, which will have to be squarely addressed 
going forward.
Broadly  defined,  there  are  three  principle  options  for 
implementing the Copenhagen Accord and advancing inter-
national climate negotiations.
The UN Treaty Approach
A wide array of countries, both developed and developing, 
have called for turning the Copenhagen Accord into a legally 
binding agreement through the UN negotiating process lead-
ing up to Cancún in December.52 A treaty adopted by all 192 
Parties to the UNFCCC would indeed be the strongest and 
broadest possible statement of global political will and provide 
a firm foundation for building the finance, adaptation, and 
technology cooperation institutions and mechanisms called 
for in the Copenhagen Accord (Werksman and Herbertson 
2009).
But  there  continues  to  be  fundamental  disagreement 
about which countries should be legally bound under such an 
agreement. The United States, Australia, Japan, Canada, and 
Russia continue to insist that while the content of countries’ 
commitments may differ based on level of development and 
52. See for example: Submission by Spain and the European Commission on be-
half of the European Union and its Member States. (February 12, 2010); Jiabao, 
Premier Wen. 2010. Letter to Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen. (January); and 
Japan’s submission on the process of the AWGs in 2010. Available at www.unfccc.
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capabilities, all countries must be bound to their commit-
ments in the same way under a new treaty. BASIC countries 
continue to reject this approach. Chinese Premier Wen has 
called for a “binding” outcome in Cancún that includes a 
second commitment period to the Kyoto Protocol for Annex 
I Parties, comparable emission reductions commitments from 
the  United  States,  and  voluntary  mitigation  actions  from 
developing countries with financial and technology support 
from  developed  countries.53  This  view  has  been  echoed  by 
other emerging economies. 
The relationship of the Copenhagen Accord to the two 
official UN negotiating tracks is also the subject of consider-
able dispute. In a joint communiqué following a January 2 
meeting in India, the BASIC countries welcomed the accord, 
but “underscored the centrality” of the LCA and Kyoto Proto-
col, and the negotiating texts from these sessions that were left 
on the table full of brackets in Copenhagen, in moving toward 
a legally binding agreement at COP16 in Mexico.5 In subse-
quent  submissions  to  the  UNFCCC,  China,  India,  Brazil, 
and South Africa have all individually indicated that they see 
the Copenhagen Accord as a document that can inform the 
LCA and Kyoto Protocol negotiating tracks where appropri-
ate.55 Speaking at the Center for American Progress in early 
February, US Special Envoy for Climate Change Todd Stern 
rejected this interpretation of the accord, describing it as “an 
operational document with landmark provisions” and that it 
can’t “be cherry-picked, since, like any meaningful agreement, 
it represents a fair balance.”56 
Unless  these  differences  can  be  resolved  over  the  next 
nine  months,  there  is  little  chance  of  a  treaty  in  Cancún. 
And even if the major players can reach agreement, a COP 
decision will still require consensus of all 192 Parties to the 
53. Jiabao, Premier Wen. 2010. Letter to Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen. 
(January), Available at www.unfccc.int.
5. Joint Statement issued at the conclusion of the Second Meeting of Ministers of 
BASIC Group. (January 2, 2010). Available at www.moef.nic.in.
55. See China’s Submission of Views on the AWG-LCA and AWG-KP. (February 
15, 2010); India’s Submission on the Work of AWG-LCA and AWG-KP; Brazil’s 
submission to the UNFCCC. (February 10, 2010); and South Africa’s submis-
sion to the UNFCCC. (February , 2010). Available at www.unfccc.int.
56. Stern, Todd. 2010. Remarks at the Center for American Progress, Wash-
ington, February 9. Available at www.americanprogress.org.
UNFCCC.  Going  down  this  path  without  addressing  the 
underlying issues of legal form and negotiating forum will 
almost certainly produce a process—not unlike the current 
Doha Round in international trade negotiations—that drags 
on indefinitely sapping the international community’s appe-
tite for the challenge. 
The Small-group Political Approach
The chaos in Copenhagen and the shortcomings of a consen-
sus-driven UN negotiating process have left many observers 
looking for an alternative forum to implement the Copenha-
gen Accord and advance international climate change coop-
eration. Since most countries set their climate policy through 
domestic legislation rather than international negotiations and 
meaningful penalties for noncompliance are not on the table, 
the necessity of a treaty is open for debate. Indeed, many argue 
that demanding commitments that are internationally legally 
binding reduces ambition because countries need to ensure a 
healthy margin between what they commit to and what they 
think they can actually achieve. 
A  politically  binding,  rather  than  legally  binding, 
approach  opens  up  a  range  of  possible  negotiating  forums 
other  than  the  UNFCCC.  The  most  promising  existing 
institutions are the G-20 and the MEF, each with its own 
strengths and weaknesses. The G-20 has considerable support 
from both developed and large developing countries after its 
success in responding to the global financial crisis over the 
past two years. There are already two G-20 summits scheduled 
this year, one in June and another in November. The G-20’s 
broad scope could be an asset or a liability. Addressing climate 
change alongside global economic and financial issues would 
allow for a more integrated approach to a low-carbon future. 
But limited bandwidth during G-20 summits could limit the 
amount of time spent addressing climate change issues. A G-
20 energy/environment ministerial, similar to the current G-20 
finance ministerial, could help address this issue. Getting the 
G-20 to take up climate change in a meaningful way would also 
require consent of the member countries. 
The  MEF  is  a  more  focused  forum  with  an  existing 
mandate to address climate change. Much of the Copenhagen 
Accord reflects consensus achieved at the MEF Leaders Meeting 
last July. The MEF also launched a Global Partnership aimed at 
accelerating international technology cooperation and produced 
10 technology action plans in November that start to chart 
the pathway to a low-carbon future. The MEF does not have 
as much international credibility as the G-20, however, both 
because it was created and has been chaired by the United States 
and because it was criticized in the run-up to Copenhagen as an 
exclusive process. 
Negotiated directly by heads of state, 
the Copenhagen Accord reflects a 
high level of political will to address 
the climate change challenge.N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 5   m a r c h   2 0 1 0
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Both the G-20 and the MEF would need to find a way to 
give vulnerable countries a voice. While not a significant source 
of greenhouse gas emissions, island states, least developed coun-
tries, and African states have the most to lose from a warming 
world and are thus important stakeholders in climate change 
negotiations. Their voice will be critical in implementing the 
Copenhagen Accord, both to give it credibility and to pressure 
developed and developing countries alike to meet their emission 
reduction commitments. The G-20 and the MEF could include 
representatives of AOSIS, LDCs, the African Group, and other 
appropriate country groupings, for climate-related discussions 
through a G-20+5 or MEF+5 process.
The countries that drafted the Copenhagen Accord could 
also set up a new forum. This “Climate 30” (C-30) would have 
both a stake in the accord and credibility with key constitu-
encies. The challenge would be in convening such a grouping. 
The call for a C-30 summit would need to come from both 
developed and developing countries, and would stand the best 
chance of success if they were countries other than Denmark, 
China, the European Union or the United States. 
While a small-country grouping would prove more work-
able  in  reaching  political  agreement  on  key  climate  change 
issues, it’s unclear how successful it would be in establishing 
the mechanisms and institutions called for in the Copenhagen 
Accord. Some relationship between a Copenhagen Accord and 
the UNFCCC would still be required. More importantly, it’s 
clear that while they support the Copenhagen Accord, BASIC 
countries are committed to the UNFCCC as the primary nego-
tiating vehicle and the asymmetry of the Kyoto Protocol as the 
preferred  legal  paradigm.  Getting  China,  India,  Brazil,  and 
South Africa to agree to advance climate change negotiations 
through a small group process will be extremely difficult if they 
see it coming at the expense of the UNFCCC. 
Finally, while a political agreement is arguably sufficient 
to address the climate change challenge over the next decade as 
countries formulate domestic policy and gain confidence in its 
effectiveness, by 2020 the need for a more top-down approach 
will grow. Every year that passes the number of possible emis-
sion pathways that will keep global temperature increases below 
2 degrees Celsius diminish. As we move down the emission 
reduction curve there is less room for uncertainty or experimen-
tation and the need for an international treaty that divides up 
acceptable global GHG emissions between countries grows. 
The Hybrid Approach
The  international  community  does  not  necessarily  need  to 
choose between a UN process aimed at producing a legally 
binding agreement and a small-group process seeking to begin 
work  now  on  a  politically-binding  basis.  The  formal  UN 
negotiations will continue, with meetings for the coming year 
already being scheduled. Delegates can resume the two-track 
negotiations informed by the political agreement reflected in 
the Copenhagen Accord as they try to resolve the legacy of the 
Kyoto Protocol with the Bali mandate and seek consensus on a 
legally-binding outcome. 
At the same time, the G-20, MEF, or a new “C-30” should 
seek to implement the Copenhagen Accord to build upon the 
momentum of the past two years and begin work immediately 
to reduce emissions and provide financial assistance to those in 
need. Where possible, this small-group process would look to 
the UNFCCC to establish financing, technology, and transpar-
ency guidelines and mechanisms, but if consensus through the 
UNFCCC is not possible, the small-group process could do this 
work or turn to other institutions. The fact that the COP only 
“took note” of the accord makes this strategy possible, because 
the UNFCCC does not have exclusive rights to its provisions. 
It reflects political will of a broad and representative group of 
countries at the highest level and those countries should be held 
to account in whatever forum they meet. 
The hybrid approach would prevent near-term substantive 
action from being held hostage to disagreements over legal form, 
but would also help build support for a treaty by demonstrating 
that meaningful international cooperation is possible. It will be 
challenging, given the path-dependency of the UNFCCC and 
the reluctance of emerging economies to engage in a negotiat-
ing form that might lead to greater commitments. Copenhagen 
has  provided  a  unique  opportunity  to  face  hard  truths  and 
rethink our approach. It’s critical we do so, as the international 
community’s commitment to tackle this challenge can’t survive 
a repeat in Cancún, and the climate doesn’t have time for a 
Doha-like approach. 
The hybrid approach would prevent near-
term substantive action from being held 
hostage to disagreements over legal form, 
but would also help build support for a 
treaty by demonstrating that meaningful 
international cooperation is possible.N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 5   m a r c h   2 0 1 0
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